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 Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science (2003a), as
umber of articles and short essays, Fuller calls our attention to
difference between two radically different approaches to science
ophy, namely, Karl Popper’s and Thomas Kuhn’s. Most interest-
he present work Fuller highlights an aspect that underlies their
 views about the politics of ideas – a facet that, in Kuhn’s case, is
icitly stated nor confronted, but whose shadow hangs over most
stemological works. Furthermore, by putting the issue of the
lity of intellectuals within a broader context, Fuller helps us to
erstand its scope and critically approach it.
In Popper’s case the critique of intellectuals springs from the fact that ideas
always have unintended and unforeseeable consequences: ‘If ideas can be
vehicles for launching us into a glorious future, they can equally serve to
propel us to a disastrous fate’ (Fuller, 2003b: 21). Therefore, Fuller continues,
‘A responsible intellectual is mindful of just this Janus-faced potential of
ideas. It implies both a cognitive and an ethical burden’ (ibid.). On the other
hand, Kuhn’s concern with the puzzle-solving activity that characterizes
paradigm-driven periods of normal science betrays a justificationist concep-
tion of rationality that prevents the very possibility of freedom of thought,
decision and responsibility that informs the nature of Popper’s philosophy.
Whereas Popper clearly separated justification and criticism, in Kuhn (as well
as in Wittgenstein, from whom Kuhn draws many of his philosophical tenets)
justification and criticism remain fused. That is why their followers do not
have the option of using criticism as an alternative to justification and turn
to description of frameworks and standards. Criticism becomes an alterna-
tive to justification only after the two notions are clearly separated. Once this
separation is achieved, instead of positing authorities to guarantee and criti-
cize actions and opinions, the aim becomes that of constructing a philo-
sophical programme to foster the growth of knowledge and to counteract
intellectual error.
The idea that paradigms (or lexicons, in Kuhn’s later terminology) are not
and cannot be true or false per se is but a variant of logical positivists’ jus-
tificationism: it is the idea that truth is grounded in the solidarity of beliefs
within a given scientific community, an immediate consequence of Kuhn’s
highlighting of the communitarian character of science. According to this
view the truth of a scientific theory reflects or is a projection of the con-
sensus within the scientific community. A theory is false when it is rejected
by that community. What is true is what experts agree to be true; what is
open is that on which leaders do not care or dare to have an opinion. Pos-
itivists as well placed particular emphasis on community: they regarded
communal collaboration as important for the production and justification
of scientific knowledge, which they in turn regarded as important for the
unity of science. It is this very emphasis that fuels Kuhn’s conception of
science as a social institution and his attempt to define scientific knowledge,
if not truth itself, in terms of the consensus of belief that is forged among
its members.
However, advance in knowledge has nothing to do with membership in
communities (Wittgenstein notwithstanding). The strength of a community
and the solidarity of belief offer ease and disengagement: for sure, they offer
intellectuals the possibility to entrench themselves more firmly and better
enforce their ideas on others, whatever the effects on the real development of
science and on the community. But it is a two-edged sword, for when we add
to Kuhn’s ideas that scientists must commit themselves uncritically to a
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paradigm and that it is appropriate for the profession to ostracize those who
disagree, then it becomes difficult to see how science can uphold and encour-
age freedom of thought.
Furthermore, what Kuhn himself portrayed as a realistic description of the
way science actually works takes on a strongly normative function. Feyer-
abend spotted this aspect immediately after reading the typescript of The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions: ‘What you are writing’, he wrote in a 1960
letter to Kuhn, ‘is not just history’:
It is ideology covered up as history . . . you use a kind of double-talk
where every assertion may be read in two ways, as the report of a
historical fact, and as a methodological rule. You thereby take your
readers in. You present your material in such a manner that . . . history
seems to satisfy the principle that ALLES WIRKLICHE IST VERNÜNFTIG so
that evaluations can then be directly derived from historical study.
(Feyerabend, 1995: 355)
With a different terminology, Kuhn is nothing but employing and stretch-
ing Wittgenstein’s ideas. For, according to the Austrian philosopher, each
discipline, ‘language game’ or ‘form of life’ has its own standards, principles
or ‘logic’, which need not be compared or be reducible to any other standards
or (external) principle and which it is the special task of the philosopher to
describe and clarify – not the least to judge, defend or criticize. There is no
arguing or judging among disciplines: criticism, evaluation and explanation
would no longer be proper philosophical aims. Knowledge is essentially
divided, and description is all that remains to the philosopher. All he can do
is to describe the logics, grammars or first principles of the various kinds of
discourse, and the many sorts of language games and forms of life in which
they are embedded. Philosophical critique is no longer of content, but of
criteria application. Paul Feyerabend highlighted this very clearly in his 1970
rejoinder to Kuhn, plainly declaring that all that is left would be ‘consola-
tions for the specialists’.
Kuhn’s philosophy is more interested in the acceptance, not in the content,
of ideas, confining itself to their present – rather than potential – power. It
legitimates existing structures and neglects the aims of those operating within
them, above all the growth of knowledge and the advancement of learning.
At the heart of his views lies a dangerous form of imperialism, according to
which disciplines and their practitioners must conform: they must not judge
one another, and they must not try to describe a common world in collabor-
ation with other disciplines, since each one has its own. Kuhn’s philosophy,
regardless of its author’s intentions, tries to convince us that no fundamental
decision or responsibility on our part is required, that we really should not
waste our time on criticism or on trying to understand, and that everything
will and must go well if we only fall into step behind the institutionalized
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scientific dogma of the day and its experts. The risk is to replace philosophical
and scientific values of truth, rationality, and the freedom of thought with
political power, solidarity and (blind, dogmatic) commitment to belief (see
Gattei, 2004: chs 5–6).
Kuhn’s relativism gives rise to a sort of conservative defence of whatever
belief system is construed as rational according to the established scientific
community. Despite revolutionary science is being acknowledged, critical
attitude is systematically discouraged: instead, normal science is regarded as
the essence of the scientific enterprise, and dogmatic commitment to a
paradigm (or a lexicon) is upheld as a necessary prerequisite for rational
knowledge and social harmony. And the desperate search for ‘harmony’,
rather than critical engagement, often characterizes Kuhn’s contributions to
public debates and reflects in his writings. Indeed, while Kuhn’s history of
science does not conceal controversy and error, his philosophy of science
consistently plays them down. Rorty, as Fuller rightly notices, moves along
the same line: ‘intellectuals are often generously credited for positive develop-
ments traceable in their ideas, however unintended, while blame is withheld
from them for the negative developments, however intended’ (Fuller, 2003b:
31). Controversy is a vital and regular factor in the scientific tradition: by
saying that for most of the time leading scientists rightly shield from criti-
cism the ruling scientific idea of the day Kuhn and Rorty utterly disregard
its relevance for the growth of knowledge and the development of human
beings (on these issues, see Agassi, 1997 and 2002).
Intellectuals, and particularly their leaders, academic professors, advocate
a commonwealth of learning governed by a free market of ideas. Kuhn’s phil-
osophy and sociology of knowledge are incompatible with a free market of
ideas – and yet they are extremely popular and widely recommended. It is
not too difficult to see why. As Joseph Agassi has argued, the immense popu-
larity of Kuhn’s stereotypical image of the scientific enterprise is part and
parcel of the betrayal of the intellectuals of the second half of the 20th
century. Kuhnian ideas do serve a function in contemporary academic life:
they legitimate the existing structures of powerful academic institutions –
they legitimate the very system in which Kuhn was intellectually born and
trained, and from which he benefited so much. Kuhn legitimates, in other
words, the scientific establishment and offers a theoretical defence of intel-
lectual cartels. Popper’s philosophy, by contrast, aims at undermining them,
casting doubt on all expertise and making the challenges to establishments
part and parcel of the scientific enterprise. That is the reason why academic
leaders prefer to embrace Kuhn’s views and hold Popper at a distance. Intel-
lectual leaders need Kuhnian ideology to legitimate what they do, for
undoubtedly Kuhn is largely right on the descriptive level: in practice, many
intellectuals tend to work against the free market of ideas. They attempt to
control the intellectual landscape and what they call intellectual freedom is,
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in fact, protection from intellectual competition. The continuing popularity
of Kuhn’s ideas among academics, four decades after they were first pub-
lished, is strong evidence that the market-place of ideas is severely regulated
and that intellectuals are often regimented in the steps of their alleged leaders.
As in the case of Wittgenstein, Kuhn told professionals what they wanted to
hear.
Whereas most professional philosophers, following Wittgenstein and
Kuhn, compartmentalize knowledge and take the view that the scope of
rationality is severely limited, Popper does neither and offers instead a uni-
versal theory of unlimited rational criticism. Both Kuhn and Wittgenstein
have created philosophies that justify and rationalize entrenchment and
reduce competition. Popper advanced an evolutionary epistemology accord-
ing to which ideas are subjected to sharp competition, science is a revol-
utionary activity dedicated to pursuing truth by overthrowing error, and
unsuccessful ideas are weeded out by confronting them with contrary
evidence or arguments. By contrast, in Kuhn’s eyes most of science is bound
by tradition and commitment to reigning paradigms that are guarded and
licensed by scientific elites. Intellectual revolution is a rarity, likely to be more
disruptive than enlightening: the history of science is not the story of the
struggle for truth among competing theoretical frameworks – rather, it is the
story of successive ideological hegemonies that work to perpetuate the pro-
fession, not to advance knowledge.
As William Bartley put it in his extraordinary last book (1990), our knowl-
edge is unfathomable: when we affirm a theory, we at the same time propose
its logical implications – that is, we affirm all those statements that follow
from it, as well as those implications that stem from combining it with other
theories that we also propose or assume. As a consequence, the informative
content of any theory includes (non-trivial) statements that cannot be
known in advance. This means that intellectuals cannot afford to set them-
selves above the debate. Each of us is needed to help objectify and to probe
our ideas, so as to better understand what we are saying. In particular, we
need to be able both to give and to receive criticism. If we want to learn from
a debate, our aim should be to lose and not to win, for the more all partici-
pants lose, the more we all win – that is, learn. Such a critical conversation,
conducted in the service of truth, is also a token of our respect for one
another, grounded in our mutual recognition of the fallibility of the human
condition.
This is no easy task: our choice in favour of reason does not guarantee that
we will be successful in our search for the truth, nor in the discovery of our
errors. It does not even necessarily lead to the avoidance of violence. Of
course, it may lead to these things – but it also may not, and faith in reason
may become important precisely when it does not. However, we must go
through all this if we want not only to preach reason, but to put it into action
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– and do so with people whose views and life-styles are different from, and
hence more of a challenge to, our own. Reasoning is engaging in communi-
cation with others: it requires non-epistemic values of social conduct. Central
among these is the moral imperative to take others and their arguments seri-
ously – i.e. to respect them, that is, to be ready not only to allow differences
to exist (tolerance), but also to try to learn from them (respect). Popper
accepted this challenge and invited fellow intellectuals to engage in dialogue
with the full awareness of its difficulty and of the responsibility involved in
our ideas, decisions and actions. His invitation calls us all back to Kant’s
words:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the
guidance of another. The immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not
lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it
without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is there-
fore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding! (Kant,
1784: 54)
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